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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-3355
________________
KURT H. KRAMER; MARIA E. KRAMER,
               Appellants
 v.
THOMAS KUBICKA; BONNIE KUBICKA
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-02621)
District Judge: Honorable William J. Martini
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 30, 2007
BEFORE: SLOVITER, McKEE and AMBRO, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: March 13, 2007)
______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Appellants Kurt and Maria Kramer, proceeding pro se, appeal the District Court’s
entry of summary judgment in favor of Appellees, Thomas and Bonnie Kubicka.  For the
reasons that follow, we will affirm.
2Appellants are a married couple who had a longstanding personal relationship with
Appellees, also a married couple.  Between 1978 and 1993, Appellees made periodic
loans to Appellants, totaling $28,700.  Appellants signed a note for each of the loans,
which were made at a range of interest rates.  Appellants made interest-only payments on
these notes until March 1994, at which point they stopped making payments entirely.  In
February 1998, they instituted a bankruptcy action, which was dismissed in May 1999 for
failure to present a workable plan.  The following month, Appellees filed an action
against Appellants in the Court of Common Pleas in Bucks County, Pennsylvania
demanding the total outstanding on the notes plus interest, for a sum of $53,187.20. 
According to Appellants, after their attorney failed to file an answer, default judgment
was entered against them on September 3, 2000.  On May 16, 2001, Appellants wrote a
check to Appellees for $59,500.  The check was cashed on May 18, 2001.  Satisfaction
was entered in Pennsylvania on July 3, 2001 and in New Jersey on August 7, 2001.
On May 18, 2005, Appellants initiated this lawsuit in the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey.  In their complaint, Appellants allege violations of
New Jersey and Pennsylvania usury laws, the federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15
U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.  Appellees moved to dismiss the complaint on a
number of grounds, including expiration of the statute of limitations.  Appellants moved
for summary judgment.  The District Court converted Appellees’ motion to dismiss to one
for summary judgment and granted it, holding that Appellants’ state law claims were
3barred by res judicata, and that their federal claims, to the extent they were not also barred
by res judicata, were time-barred.  Appellants filed the instant appeal.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a
district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.  Pennsylvania Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt,
63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995).  Summary judgment is proper only if it appears “that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Carrasca v. Pomeroy, 313 F.3d 828,
832-33 (3d Cir. 2002). 
The District Court held that both Appellants’ RICO and TILA claims were time-
barred.  We agree.  As the District Court noted, TILA claims are subject to a one-year
limitations period, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e), and RICO claims to a four-year limitations
period.  See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156
(1987).   We have held that a RICO claim accrues when a plaintiff knew or should have
known of the injury alleged.  See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 359
F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2004).  The injury Appellants complain of is the alleged collection
of an “unlawful debt” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6).  We agree with the District
Court that the last payment that could so qualify was made by Appellants in 1994, and
therefore does not satisfy the four-year limitations period.  
Appellants contest this conclusion, relying on their argument that the default
judgment is void ab initio due to Appellees’ failure to serve them personally, in addition
to serving their attorney, as required by Pa. R. Civ. P. 237.1(a)(2)(ii).  See Erie Ins. Co. v.
Bullard, 839 A.2d 383, 387 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).  Because they claim that the default
judgment is therefore a nullity, they maintain that their payment of $59,500 should also
be considered a predicate act.  We disagree.  A judgment entered by a court of competent
jurisdiction does not fall within the definition of an “unlawful debt” as defined by the
RICO statute.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6).  As no court has declared the default judgment
null, we continue to consider it valid.
With respect to Appellants’ state law claims, because we affirm the District
Court’s dismissal of Appellants’ federal claims, we conclude that the District Court could
have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims.  See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3); see also Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, Pennsylvania, 983 F.2d
1277, 1284-85 (3d Cir. 1993).
Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court properly entered summary
judgment in favor of Appellees and will affirm its order.
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